Can Pakistan Launch a Nuclear Attack on India Over the Pahalgam Conflict

Recent provocative statements from Pakistani officials, including Minister Hanif Abbasi, have escalated tensions between India and Pakistan, particularly in the context of the Pahalgam conflict. Abbasi claimed Pakistan’s 130 nuclear warheads, including missiles like Ghauri, Shaheen, and Ghaznavi, are aimed at India and ready for use if India disrupts Pakistan’s water supply or escalates military actions. Pakistan’s Defense Minister has also hinted at nuclear retaliation as a “last resort” in response to Indian aggression. These statements raise a critical question: Can Pakistan realistically launch a nuclear attack on India? To address this, we must evaluate Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, domestic stability, international support, and adherence to legal protocols.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal: A Closer Look

Pakistan possesses approximately 130 nuclear warheads, as per recent estimates:

• 36 air-based warheads
• 126 land-based warheads
• 8 sea-based warheads

Each warhead has a yield of at least 12 kilotons, equivalent to the Hiroshima bomb, with missile ranges spanning 200 to 1,500 kilometers. For instance, a Shaheen-I missile launched from Sargodha could target Delhi, while the longer-range Shaheen-III could reach as far as Bihar or even Israel, according to reports like those from The Washington Post. Pakistan’s nuclear program, developed with significant external assistance, is a point of national pride but also a complex geopolitical tool.

A Brief History of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

Pakistan became the first Islamic nation to possess nuclear weapons after six successful tests on May 28, 1998. Unlike most nuclear powers, Pakistan’s program was built with minimal domestic investment, relying heavily on foreign aid and technology:

• Financial Backing: Libya provided $100 million in 1974, with Saudi Arabia offering substantial funding for Project 706.
• Uranium Enrichment: A.Q. Khan, Pakistan’s nuclear pioneer, stole enrichment designs from a Dutch facility, establishing the Kahuta plant.
• Bomb Design: China supplied the proven Chic-4 design and even allowed Pakistan to conduct its first nuclear test on Chinese soil in 1990.
• Missile Technology: North Korea provided missile designs, with Pakistan’s Ghauri missile closely resembling the No-Dong missile.

This “jugaad” approach—leveraging foreign resources—enabled Pakistan to counter India’s nuclear test in 1974 (Operation Smiling Buddha) and establish itself as a nuclear power.

Can Pakistan Afford a Nuclear Attack?

To assess the feasibility of Pakistan launching a nuclear attack, we must consider three dimensions: national capacity, international support, and legal constraints.

1. National Capacity: Internal Chaos as a Barrier

Pakistan’s domestic situation is precarious, undermining its ability to pursue a nuclear conflict:

• Economic Crisis: Pakistan’s economy is on the brink, reliant on frequent IMF loans. A nuclear war would devastate its already fragile financial system.
• Separatist Movements: Provinces like Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are rife with unrest:
  • Sindh: Protests against the Cholistan Canal Project, which diverts Indus River water, have led to blockades of Karachi Port, disrupting trade and risking fuel and manufacturing crises.
  • Balochistan: The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has intensified attacks, including three IED blasts on April 25, 2025, killing 10 soldiers, and a March 18, 2025, attack allegedly killing 90. Balochistan’s historical resistance to Pakistani rule fuels separatist ambitions.
  • Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other groups like ISIS-Khorasan conducted attacks, including a bombing on April 28, 2025, killing six. These groups seek to destabilize Pakistan’s northwest.
  • Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK): Protests against the Mines and Minerals Bill reflect local resentment toward Pakistan’s exploitation of resources.
• Military Strain: Over 1,000 Pakistani soldiers have died in domestic attacks since 2024, stretching the military’s resources.

These internal conflicts suggest Pakistan lacks the cohesion to sustain a nuclear war, as separatist groups could exploit any escalation to push for independence.

2. International Support: Limited Allies

Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions face significant international hurdles:

• China: While China has historically supported Pakistan’s nuclear program to counter India, its backing in an actual nuclear conflict is uncertain. A nuclear war would disrupt China’s regional influence and global trade ambitions.
• Other Allies: Traditional supporters like Saudi Arabia and Turkey may hesitate to endorse a nuclear attack due to global repercussions. Even Libya, a past financial backer, lacks the clout to provide meaningful support today.
• Global Condemnation: The international community, including the UN and major powers like the US, would likely impose severe sanctions on Pakistan for nuclear aggression, as seen with Russia’s conventional war in Ukraine. A declassified CIA report from the 1990s estimated only a 20% chance of nuclear war between India and Pakistan, even during heightened tensions, underscoring the improbability of such an action.

Pakistan’s isolation would be compounded by India’s growing global influence and diplomatic ties, leaving Pakistan with few allies willing to risk supporting a nuclear gambit.

3. Legal and Operational Constraints

Nuclear launches are governed by strict protocols, making an impulsive attack unlikely:

• Nuclear Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs): India and Pakistan exchange lists of nuclear installations annually on January 1 and notify each other of major missile tests near borders to prevent misunderstandings. These protocols have held despite decades of hostility.
• No First Use Policy: India adheres to a “No First Use” nuclear doctrine, meaning Pakistan would likely initiate any nuclear exchange. However, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is “non-mated,” meaning warheads, missiles, and launch systems are stored separately (e.g., bombs at Dera Ghazi and missiles at Taranawa). Assembling and deploying them requires significant time and movement, which would be detected by global satellite networks.
• Nuclear Command Authority: Pakistan’s nuclear decisions require approval from a committee of bureaucrats, military chiefs, and politicians, culminating in the Prime Minister’s authorization via secret launch codes. This multi-layered process prevents unilateral action.
• Global Surveillance: Retired Lieutenant General Satish Dua has noted that satellite surveillance would detect any nuclear preparations, triggering immediate international backlash. Pakistan’s economic dependence on global trade makes it vulnerable to such pressure.

These legal and operational barriers significantly reduce the likelihood of Pakistan launching a nuclear attack without facing catastrophic consequences.

The Pahalgam Conflict: A Diversion?

The Pahalgam attack, blamed on Pakistan, may be less about nuclear posturing and more about internal politics. Senior Pakistani journalist Adil Raja, with 1.6 million social media followers, alleged that Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir orchestrated the attack to distract from domestic corruption scandals and economic woes. Such claims align with Pakistan’s history of using anti-India rhetoric to unify its populace and deflect criticism from governance failures. For instance, former Army Chief Qamar Bajwa amassed significant wealth post-tenure, raising questions about military corruption amid Pakistan’s economic struggles.

India’s Response: A New Era of Action

India’s response to the Pahalgam conflict signals a shift from restraint to decisiveness. The Prime Minister has granted the military autonomy to choose the mode, target, and timing of a counterattack, which could range from airstrikes to surgical strikes or targeted eliminations of terrorist leaders. Speculation suggests potential action in PoK or against Pakistan’s military and terrorist masterminds, similar to the US’s targeted killings. India’s past actions, like the 2016 Uri surgical strike and 2019 Balakot airstrike, demonstrate its willingness to cross borders, yet Pakistan refrained from nuclear escalation even then.

Conclusion: Nuclear War Remains Unlikely

While Pakistan’s nuclear threats are alarming, a full-scale nuclear attack on India over the Pahalgam conflict is highly improbable. Pakistan’s internal instability, lack of international support, and adherence to legal protocols severely limit its ability to act on such threats. The Pahalgam attack appears more as a calculated move to mask domestic failures than a prelude to nuclear war. India, now a nation of “strong action” rather than “strong condemnation,” is poised to respond decisively, likely through targeted military measures rather than escalation to nuclear conflict. As tensions simmer, the world watches closely, but history and logic suggest restraint will prevail over catastrophe.

Jai Hind.